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SILVA v. UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE:
THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE BETWEEN
STUDENT HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment' of college students2 by professors is a practice as
old as the university system itself. Only in the past two decades,4
Catharine A. MacKinnon, in her work Sexual Harassment of Working Women, supplied a
workable definition of sexual harassment that several courts have accepted:
Sexual harassment... refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the
context of a relationship of unequal power. Central to the concept is the use of power
derived from one social sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another.
... When one is sexual, the other material, the cumulative sanction is particularly
potent.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979): see Elaine
D. Ingulli, Sexual Harassment in Education, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 281, 283 & n.8 (1987).
"MacKinnon is probably the most widely-cited reference in the law of sexual harassment." Id.
Courts which have cited to MacKinnon's definition include Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 908 n. 18 (1Ith Cir. 1982) (citing MacKinnon while delineating two basic varieties of sexual
harassment, 'offensive environment' and 'quid pro quo'); Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618
F. Supp. 1438, 1442 (S.D.W. Va. 1985) (referring to MacKinnon's definition of sexual
harassment); Ferguson v. DuPont, 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1196 (D. Del. 1985) (holding that
employer cannot be held liable for hostile environment created by employee when employer took
prompt measures to improve environment): Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891, 897 (D.D.C.
1982) (utilizing MacKinnon's explanation of limitations on tort remedies for sexual harassment).
Cf. ROBERT O. RIGGS ET AL., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: FROM CONFLICT
TO COMMUNITY 36-38 (ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report No. 2. 1993) (noting definitions
of sexual harassment utilized by various universities).
But see KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX. FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 87-
112 (1993) (criticizing MacKinnon's and other feminist definitions of sexual harassment).
2 Sexual harassment on college campuses includes serious assault, rape, verbal harassment.
pressure for sexual activity, remarks about women's clothing, unnecessary and unwelcome pat-
ting, pinching, and touching. See Ingulli, supra note 1. at 284. Sexual harassment in the
educational context is also problematic in elementary and secondary schools. See generally
Monica L. Sherer, Comment. No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liabilir Under Title IX for
Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (1993) (discussing student to student sexual
harassment in elementary and secondary schools).
3 See BILLIE W. DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 11 (2d ed. 1990). "Sexual harassment of college students is not new.
A familiar jest is 'Where there has been a student body, there has always been a faculty for love.'
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:609
however, has the true magnitude of this problem become apparent.5
• . . [I]t seems likely that sexual harassment has existed as long as there have been women
students and male professors." Id.
Ancient Rome adopted many Greek methods of education for young students, chief among
which was the "pedagogue" system:
[To protect [the student] from danger, both physical and moral, [the student] was
placed in the care of a trusted slave of the household, who . . . was known as [the
student's] paidagogos . . . . It was he who helped the parents to instil [sic] into the
children what was right and what was wrong, all the details of proper behaviour.
STANLEY F. BONNER. EDUCATION IN ANCIENT ROME 38 (1977). "Pedagogues" were severely
punished for any form of sexual advance towards their students. Id. at 41. "[I]n one instance.
when a 'pedagogue' allowed a young girl to be seduced, the father, a Roman knight, with all the
ruthless severity of early Rome, put them both to death." Id. But see ALAN B. COBBAN. THE
MEDIEVAL UNIVERSITIES: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION 62-63 (1975) (describing
how students at earliest known university in Bologna controlled hiring and payment of professors.
and effectuated "quasi-totalitarian regime").
' In the 1960s and 1970s both male and female students, described as "activists," demanded
student representation and grievance procedures. See DZIECH & WEINER. supra note 3. at 11.
While a multitude of women's issues were addressed, sexual harassment was ignored. Id.
' Sexual harassment of college students by their professors is still a pervasive problem. See
DZIECH & WEINER. supra note 3, at 13-14 (summarizing studies on prevalence of sexual
harassment of students by faculty members); L.A. Kauffman. Sexual Harassment: How Political
is the Personal?. THE NATION, Mar. 26, 1988. at 419.
As a 1982-1985 investigation by Ms. and other studies have shown, about 15 percent
of women at American colleges and universities have been raped. More than half
experience some form of sexual harassment during their academic career, ranging from
verbal abuse to unwanted sexual contact, assault or rape. Between 20 and 25 percent
are sexually propositioned or harassed by their professors.
Id.; see also MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN. ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL 11-12. tbl. 1.6 (1991) (reviewing current research
on incidence of sexual harassment in public schools). See generally Anne L. Bryant. Hostile
Hallways: The AA UW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools, 63 J. SCH. HEALTH
355 (1993) (discussing survey revealing 85% of girls and 76% of boys in secondary and
elementary school have been sexually harassed): Kelly Corbett et al., Sexual Harassment in High
School, 25 YOUTH & SoC'Y 93 (1993) (discussing study of college students' recollections of
sexual harassment in high school); Robert D. Glaser & Joseph S. Thorpe, Unethical Intimacy:
A Survey of Sexual Contact and Advances Betveen Psychology Educators and Female Graduate
Students, 41 AM. PSYCHOL. 43-51 (1986) (discussing fact that approximately one-fourth of
females with Ph.D. in Psychology have been sexually harassed by professors); Michelle A. Marks
& Eileen S. Nelson. Sexual Harassment on Campus: Effects of Professor Gender on Perception
of Sexually Harassing Behavior, 28 SEX ROLES: A JOURNAL OF RESEARCH 207 (1993)
(explaining how gender differences among perpetrators and recipients of harassment affects
perception of sexual harassment).
A key obstacle to eradicating sexual harassment from college campuses remains its
definition. See Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV.
525, 533-43 (1987) (describing difficulties in precisely defining sexual harassment and proposing
objective standard); see also PALUDI & BARICKMAN. supra, at 2-5 (reproducing several legal
definitions of sexual harassment); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: The Definition and
Measurement of a Construct, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 21. 22-24
(Michele A. Paludi ed., 1991) (listing legal definitions and categorizing them into "Type 1,"
general statements describing character of behavior and status of participants and "Type 2,"
STUDENT HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
Female students6 have refused to accept the libidinous advances of faculty
members as an inevitable part of the educational process. Students
confronted with "quid pro quo"8 sexual harassment have historically
specific, proscribed conduct).
Law review articles have addressed the analogous problem of university regulation of racist
speech. See generally Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991) (discussing consequences of enacting rules forbidding
certain kinds of campus speech and ensuing conflict of values); Charles R. Lawrence III. If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431 (arguing that
racist campus speech should not be protected under First Amendment).
6 This Comment focuses on sexual harassment on college campuses between male professors
and female students, although the writer is cognizant of the fact that other harassment scenarios
do exist, such as those between female professors and male students and between same-sex
professors and students. See Natalie J. Malovich & Jayne E. Stake, Sexual Harassment on
Campus: Individual Differences in Attitudes and Beliefs, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 127-45 (Dan H. Wishnietsky ed., 1992) (exploring difference
between male and female students in frequency and effects of sexual harassment); cf. Terry Haz-
zard, Sexual Harassment: What's Good For the Goose is Good For the Gander, in SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 33-47 (Dan H. Wishnietsky ed., 1992)
(discussing males as objects of sexual harassment in workplace).
" See Kauffman, supra note 5, at 419 ("When sexual harassment first surfaced as a campus
issue in the mid-1970's, feminist students defined it primarily as an abuse of institutionally
conferred authority.. . . This conception of sexual harassment provided a solid basis for fighting
institutionalized sexism."); Lawrence Walsh, Law ProfAssaulted Student, Suit Says. PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Apr. 20, 1994, at BI (describing lawsuit brought by former Duquesne University law
student against professor for sexual harassment); Navy Offers Courts-Martialin Sex Scandal, UPI.
Dec. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS. Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting U.S. Navy's
recommendation that four instructors at San Diego training base be court-martialed for alleged
sexual harassment of 16 female students); Kenneth Jost. Questionable Conduct, A.B.A. J., Nov.
1994, at 71 (recounting University of Maine student's sexual harassment allegation against history
professor. professor's subsequent termination by university, and arbitrator's reinstatement of
professor); see also Rorie Sherman, School Districts Sued on Sexual Harassment by Fellow
Students, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 1993, at 10 (describing student lawsuits against school districts
that allegedly failed adequately to address student-on-student sexual harassment).
Historically, students have not sought legal redress for sexual harassment because of the
university's interest in protecting faculty members. See Schneider, supra note 5, at 527-29. Other
reasons include students' temporary status as students and their financial inability to pursue legal
remedies. Id. Student sexual harassment victims have also been more concerned with their
education than the vindication of their rights. Walter B. Connolly. Jr. & Alison B. Marshall,
Sexual Harassment of University or College Students by Faculty Members. 15 J.C. & U.L. 381,
392 (1989).
s Since little guidance exists concerning the regulation of sexual harassment in academia
pursuant to Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, the following definition of quid pro
quo sexual harassment is adopted from workplace guidelines employed by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See EEOC Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994).
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
1995]
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employed the statutory framework of Title IX of the Educational Amend-
ments of 1972, 9 which governs sexual discrimination in the educational
context." ° In addition, other victimized students have sought to extend
Title IX to "hostile environment"" claims, 2 which arise from more
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual ....
Id.; see MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 32-40 (describing quid pro quo harassment in employment
context); Schneider, supra note 5, at 535 (addressing and defining quid pro quo harassment). Title
IX prohibits quid pro quo sexual harassment but does not explicitly prohibit environmental sexual
harassment. Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit
Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 85, 91 (1992).
9 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). The Congressional purpose for enacting Title IX was to
prevent the distribution of funds to educational institutions engaging in sex discrimination and to
provide students with protection against such practices. 118 CONG. REC. 5806-07 (1972).
" Title IX states in pertinent part that "[nlo person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex. be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of. or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
• . .- 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). The Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") of the United States
Department of Education, the agency authorized to enforce Title IX, has passed regulations that
address the sexual harassment problem and further define the statute's scope. 34 C.F.R.
§§ 106.1-.71 (1994).
[I]n providing any aid, benefit, or service to a student, a recipient [of federal
assistance] shall not, on the basis of sex: . . . (4) Subject any person to separate or
different rules of behavior, sanctions, or other treatment; . . . (6) Aid or perpetuate
discrimination against any person by providing significant assistance to any agency.
organization, or person which discriminates on the basis of sex in providing any aid.
benefit or service to students or employees; [or] . . . (7) Otherwise limit any person
in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity.
34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b). But see University Responses to Racial and Sexual Harassment on
Campuses, 1992: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources. 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 97-98 (1992) (statement of United States Student Association) (criticizing OCR
as underfunded and inattentive to student concerns) [hereinafter University Responses].
" For a broad definition of "hostile environment" sexual harassment in the employment
context, see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994). Sexual harassment in violation of Title VII occurs
when verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994). This Comment addresses the
First Amendment issues raised by faculty members' sexual harassment of students and is. there-
fore, more concerned with emerging judicial recognition of Title IX "hostile environment- claims
than the easily defined claims of quid pro quo harassment.
'2 See Dirk Johnson, A Sexual Harassment Case to Test Academic Freedom. N.Y. TIMES.
May 11. 1994, at D23. At the Chicago Theological Seminary, a religion professor. Graydon
Snyder, filed suit for defamation after being publicly reprimanded by the University for relating
a religious story that offended a female student. Id. "In a discussion of the role of intent in sin,
Professor Snyder recited a story from the Talmud . . . about a man who falls off a roof, lands
on a woman and accidentally has intercourse with her. The Talmud says he is innocent of sin.
since the act was unintentional." Id. The female student objected to the story because it conveyed
a message that unintentional abuse of women was permissible. Id. Professor Snyder contended
that he told the story to illustrate the Sermon on the Mount, that once a man looks at a woman
with lust in his heart, he has committed adultery. Teacher Says Gender Correctness Won Over
Free Speech, CNN NEWS, May 12, 1994, available in LEXIS. News Library. Script File: see
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subtle forms of sexual harassment. The hostile environment cause of action
derives from analogy to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 which
regulates workplace sexual discrimination.' 4 Many professors faced with
student hostile environment sexual harassment claims have responded to
such allegations by asserting their First Amendment 5 right to academic
freedom in the classroom. 6 Recently, in Silva v. University of New
20/20: The Speech Police: Is Sexual Speech Sexual Harassment? (ABC television broadcast. May
12, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File [hereinafter The Speech Police]. A
student at the California State University of Sacramento, Craig Rogers. alleged that Professor
Joanne Marrow, one of his psychology professors. sexually harassed him by conducting a
sexually explicit lecture on female sexuality. Id. "I came in and there were slides of women's
genitalia. Here I have this woman who has this huge vagina on the screen, and she's stroking it
in a very personal, sexual, intimate way which aroused me. and this is not something that I think
should be allowed." Id. (statement of Craig Rogers). Professor Marrow stated that she used the
lecture to discuss masturbation, an aspect of female sexuality, and that before conducting the
class, she warned anyone who might be uncomfortable with the lecture to leave the classroom.
Id. Rogers left, but returned when he realized that the material would be on his final exam. Id.
When the university refused to remove questions from the lecture from the final exam. Rogers
sued the state for $2.5 million on the ground that Professor Marrow had created a "hostile and
offensive learning environment" in violation of the school's sexual harassment code. The Speech
Police, supra. Rogers compared Marrow's lecture to being raped: "I had no power. I had no
control. I was being aroused and didn't want it. I felt like I was being held down." Id.
1' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-4 (1990).
'4 Title VII states, in relevant part, that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1990).
.5 U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof: or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
16 "Campuses across the country have been roiled in recent years by accusations that sexual
harassment complaints have been used to override the free speech rights of professors who hold
traditional views on the role of women." Kenneth Jost. Questionable Conduct: There Can Be A
Fine Line Between Preventing Sexual Harassment and Punishing Protected Speech. The Struggle
Between Acceptable Behavior and First Amendment Rights is Straining College Campuses and
Workplaces Across the Nation, 80 A.B.A. J.. Nov. 1994, at 70-71; see Dennis Cauchon,
Harassment, Free Speech Collide in Florida, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 1991, at 9A (stating that
First Amendment challenge is most serious threat to sexual harassment law); Anthony Flint.
Speech Codes on Campus Stir Debate over Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1991, Nation-
al/Foreign Section at 1 (demonstrating growing belief that restrictions on speech limit free
expression and violate First Amendment rights); Nat Hentoff. Speech Codes that Punish Speech,
1995]
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Hampshire,7 the New Hampshire District Court held that the University
of New Hampshire ("UNH") violated a professor's First Amendment right
to speak out on matters of public concern by suspending him for using
sexually explicit examples in a writing course. 8
Professor J. Donald Silva ("Silva"), 9 a tenured instructor of
communications at UNH, used two sexually-charged illustrations while
teaching a technical writing class. The first was a metaphor that compared
the process of "focusing" a thesis statement to the act of sexual inter-
course.2' The second was one in which Silva compared belly dancing to
a plate of jello with a vibrator underneath to illustrate the concept of "good
definition." 2 Upon hearing Silva's classroom statements, eight female
WASH. POST. Mar. 28, 1992, at A21 (finding that colleges keep devising speech codes to reflect
notion that civility can be obtained through censorship); Johnson, supra note 12, at D23 (noting
that Supreme Court has not yet determined whether sexual harassment codes violate First
Amendment right of free speech); Lawrence Walsh, Duquesne Panel OK's Reinstating Professor,
PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 24, 1994, at BI (discussing Duquesne University's reinstatement of
professor discharged for violating university's sexual harassment policy).
"7 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
is Id. at 316; see infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing Silva's classroom
examples).
19 At the time of the controversy. Silva was also pastor of the Newcastle Congregational
Church outside of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. See Professor is Suspended in Sexual Harassment
Controversy (NPR radio broadcast. Apr. 12. 1994). available in LEXIS. News Library. Script
File [hereinafter Professor is Suspended].
I "Focus is like sex. You seek a target. You zero in on your subject. You move from side
to side. You close in on the subject. You bracket the subject and center on it. Focus connects
experience and language. You and the subject become one." Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 299.
Professor Silva made this statement to his technical writing class on February 24. 1992. Id. In
an affidavit, Silva recalled his first encounter with the "focus" metaphor in a 1960's interview
with Ernest Hemingway contained in a French magazine. Id. He remembered seeing it again in
The New Yorker and in a piece by Ray Bradbury. Id. at 299-300. He later explained to school
authorities:
Focusing is the second stage of the writing process after collecting information.
Focusing on the central idea of a long technical report is a complex task for freshm[e]n
in their second semester. The relationship of the writer to her subject must have
intimacy and proximity similar to the sexual relationship between people.
Focusing requires the same long probation, adjustment, centering, a back and
forth, give and take relationship until the writer and the subject are connected and
fused as one. . . . Focus objectifies the personal experience, the act of fusion into
language of the careful observations made by the writer.
Id. at 298-99.
2 ' Later, Silva explained to school authorities that -a good definition combines a general
classification (belly dancing) with concrete specifics in a metaphor (like jelly shimmying on a
plate) to bring home clearly the meaning to one who wishes to learn this form of ethnic dancing."
Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 299. In an affidavit, Silva stated: "I had used both examples in my classes
on numerous prior occasions without incident, the Little Egypt simile [belly dancing] since the
early 1970's." Id.
STUDENT HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
students filed written sexual harassment complaints with UNH. n Relying
on a university hearing panel's findings and recommendations,' the
university president concluded that Silva had violated the University System
of New Hampshire ("USNH") Sexual Harassment Policy.24  Silva
2 The complaints were filed between February 27, 1992 and March 2, 1992. Silva. 888 F.
Supp. at 300.
While six of the complaints addressed Silva's classroom speech, two of the grievances
alleged sexually-charged, out-of-classroom conduct by Silva during the fall of 1990. Id. at 301-
02. One student, Kate Allen, alleged that Silva asked her: "[H]ow would you like to get an A [for
the class]?" Id. at 310. Another student. Holly Woodhouse, claimed that while she was on her
knees looking through the bottom drawer of a card catalog at the UNH library, Silva observed
her and said: "It looks like you've had alot [sic] of experience on your knees." Id. at 305. In
addition, after one student told her classmates that she was going to -jump on a computer," Silva
was overheard commenting to other students nearby, "I'd like to see that!" Id. Finally, suggesting
a lesbian relationship, Silva asked two female students seeking his help on an assignment: "How
long have you been together?" Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 302.
After meeting with several UNH authorities one week after he made the second classroom
statement, Silva became aware of the complaints lodged against him. Id. Those authorities
included: Dr. Brian A. Giles, the Director of the Thompson School; Neil Lubow, a professor
of philosophy and Associate Vice President of Academic Affairs at UNH; and, Jane Stapleton,
a counselor at the UNH's Sexual Harassment and Rape Prevention Program. Id.
Following the meeting, the University created "shadow classes" for those students who
wanted to transfer out of Silva's class. Id. at 303. "All of the complaining students transferred
out of Silva's class." Id.
13 Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 306-08. "It is the conclusion of the hearing panel that a reasonable
female student would find Professor Silva's comments and his behavior to be offensive, intimidat-
ing and contributing to a hostile academic environment." Id. at 307. The panel conditioned Silva's
reinstatement on several conditions including: (1) reimbursement to UNH for all costs associated
with any and all alterations in teaching assignments necessitated by Silva's behavior; (2)
participation in approved counseling sessions for a minimum of one year at his own expense; (3)
a written apology to the complainants for having created a hostile and offensive environment: and
(4) a promise not to retaliate against the complaining students. Id. at 307-08.
24 Id. at 308. Ultimately, seven of the eight original complainants requested that their
complaints be resolved under the USNH Sexual Harassment Policy. Id. at 305. The University
System of New Hampshire [USNHI] Sexual Harassment Policy provides:
All faculty, staff and students have a right to work in an environment free of
discrimination, including freedom from sexual harassment. It is the policy of the
University System of New Hampshire that no member of the University System
community may sexually harass another. ...
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when:
- such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating a hostile or offensive working or academic
environment.
- submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis
for employment or academic decisions affecting that individual.
- submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment or academic work . ..
Examples of conduct which may, if continued or repeated, constitute sexual
harassment are:
1995]
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appealed the president's decision, and an appeals board affirmed the
ruling.' Subsequently, Silva filed suit in federal district court against
UNH, several school authorities, and the eight students who initiated the
inquiry that resulted in his dismissal. 6 Silva sought a preliminary
injunction against his suspension and a declaratory judgment that the
defendants' conduct violated both his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.27 The court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Professor's
First Amendment claim, finding that Silva was likely to succeed on the
merits.s The court's opinion led the trustees of UNH to settle the
case. 29
- unwelcome sexual propositions
- graphic comments about a person's body
- sexually suggestive objects or pictures in the workplace
- sexually degrading words to describe a person
- derogatory or sexually explicit statements about an actual or supposed sexual
relationship
- unwelcome touching, patting, pinching or leering
- derogatory gender-based humor
Such conduct whether intended or not constitutes sexual harassment and is illegal
under both State and Federal law. Violations of this policy will not be permitted. Any
faculty, staff or student who violates this policy will be subject to discipline up to and
including dismissal.
Id. at 298.
2. Id. at 311.
26 Id. at 297.
, Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 297. Silva brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202:
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983. 1988: and New Hampshire state law. Id. In addition to his First and Four-
teenth Amendment claims, Silva sought the following: (1) a declaratory judgment that the defen-
dants' conduct denied him his civil rights under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983: (2) a permanent order enjoining the defendants from acting to prevent him from teaching
at UNH or from otherwise punishing him on the basis of protected speech: (3) damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of his First Amendment and due process rights; (4)
damages under state law based on allegations of breach of contract and breach of a contractual
duty of good faith and fair dealing; and (5) an award of reasonable costs and attorney's fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id.
.8 Id. at 317.
29 The trustees agreed to pay Silva $60,000 in back pay and damages, to pay $170.000 in
legal fees, and to remove all disciplinary references from Silva's record. Professor Accused of
Harassment is Reinstated, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4. 1994, at 35. While Silva felt vindicated by the
district court's decision, many students expressed concern that the decision would lead to a
"chilling effect" on students' voicing sexual harassment complaints. Id. Some students scheduled
a campus protest of the decision. Id.
Thomas Carnaselli, a UNH English professor stated: "This case involves a classroom speech
by a teacher, and the speech he used was relevant to the subject matter of his course. The stuff
[was] relevant. Maybe it was somewhat misguided . . . .Some people are offended by any
reference to sex, but that's . . . their problem." Professor is Suspended, supra note 19.
Moreover, Chris Bawling, a UNH Physics professor added: "[I]n the case of Professor Silva.
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Ruling on Silva's First Amendment claim, the court initially concluded
that Silva's classroom examples were "not of a sexual nature"3" and
promoted the valid educational objective of explaining concepts related to
his course.3' Then the court stated that the university's sexual harassment
policy32 was unconstitutional because it failed to provide Silva with
adequate notice33 that his conduct was prohibited,' 4 and was not reason-
we see someone who's actually been ... fired for accidentally offending someone." Id.
30 Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 313. The court also concluded that the students misinterpreted this
statement by viewing the statement in a sexual light. Id. at 312-13. With questionable analysis,
the court stated that the word "vibrator" does not necessarily connote a sexual device. Id. at 313.
It noted that this "misunderstanding" caused the complainants to view Silva's focus statement as
part of an "offensive academic environment." Id. This appraisal would be accurate if it did not
ignore the fact that Silva's "focus" statement was blatantly sexual in nature and occurred before
the belly-dancing statement, not after.
31 Id. at 313. The court offered only a cursory explanation of these findings.
32 The court ultimately held that the USNH Sexual Harassment Policy, as it applied to Silva's
speech, was not reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical objective of maintaining a
harmonious academic atmosphere. Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 314. The court stated that the subjective
standard of the USNH Sexual Harassment Policy failed to take into account the nation's interest
in academic freedom. Id. Emphasizing its deference to the tradition of academic freedom in the
classroom, the court stated:
No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who
guide and train our youth. To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation . . . . Scholarship
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Id. (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
33 Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 312. The court noted that to establish a violation of the First
Amendment, Silva had to show that his classroom speech was constitutionally protected and that
the speech was a motivating factor in his dismissal. Id. (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274. 287 (1977)). Nevertheless, before addressing whether Silva's
speech was constitutionally protected, the court stated that, in an effort to prevent a "chilling
effect" on the exercise of free speech or conduct, the First Amendment requires that teachers be
provided with notice of the prohibited conduct. Id. (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604).
In Kevishian, several professors refused to sign a certificate stating that they were not
Communists, or that if they ever were Communists, that they had notified the university president
to that effect. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 592. In addition, a part-time lecturer refused to take a
written oath that he had never taught or advised the overthrow of the United States and had never
been a member of a group advocating the overthrow of the United States. Id. The certificate and
oath were conditions of employment and were required pursuant to New York State regulations
promulgated in accordance with a plan "to prevent the appointment or retention of 'subversive'
persons in state employment." Id. at 591-92. Holding the requirements unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court noted:
When one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his position, one
necessarily will 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . .' For 'the threat of
sanctions may deter ... almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.' The
danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must
be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform teachers what is being
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ably related to the legitimate pedagogical objective of maintaining a
harmonious academic atmosphere.35 Finally, the court applied the
"Connick-Pickering" test,36 articulated by the Supreme Court in Connick
v. Myers37 and Pickering v. Board of Education,38 and held that because
the content, form, and context39 of Silva's statements implicated matters
of public concern,' his statements were constitutionally protected under
proscribed.
Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
I Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 312-13. Conduct prohibited by the University's sexual harassment
policy includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and repeated derogatory
or sexually explicit statements about actual or supposed sexual acts. See supra note 24. It is
submitted that since UNH partially based Silva's dismissal upon his out-of-classroom conduct and
since the USNH Sexual Harassment Policy arguably provided Silva with notice that his out-of-
classroom speech and conduct was prohibited, the court's consideration of those incidents should
have led to a different result.
I Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 313. In reaching this conclusion, the court used the First Circuit's
test for determining the legality of state regulation of an educator's classroom speech. Id. at 313
(citing Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242. 1243 (1st Cir. 1971)). The district court considered
several factors obtained from Mailloux: the age and sophistication of the students, the relationship
between the instructional technique used and the educational objective, and the context and
manner of demonstration. Id.
31 Id. at 314-16. Under the Connick-Pickering test, a government employee's speech is
protected by the First Amendment if: (1) the speech is a matter of public concern; and (2) the em-
ployee's interest in expression on the matter is not outweighed by any injury the speech could
cause to "the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (quoting Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
The court noted that the First Circuit did not use the Connick-Pickering test to determine
whether a public school teacher's classroom speech is constitutionally protected. Silva, 888 F.
Supp. at 315 n.16. Although the court followed the First Circuit's approach in applying the
Connick-Pickering test, it did so without deciding whether the Connick-Pickering test was
applicable to the classroom speech. Id. But cf. Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1010-11 (2d Cir.
1994) (applying Connick-Pickering test to speech of state law school professor).
" 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
39 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
" "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined
by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. The Court further noted that this is a question of law. not fact. Id.
at 148 n.7.
I Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 316. The court noted:
Silva's classroom statements were not statements "upon matters only of personal
interest," but rather were made for the legitimate pedagogical. public purpose of
conveying certain principles related to the subject matter of his course. Further, the
content, form, and context of said statements demonstrate that they are directly related
to (1) the preservation of academic freedom and (2) the issue of whether speech which
is offensive to a particular class of individuals should be tolerated in American schools.
Accordingly, the court finds and rules that Silva's classroom statements were related
to matters of public concern.
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the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 4'
It is submitted that the Silva court erred in holding that Silva's speech
was related to matters of public concern and constitutionally protected
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This Comment suggests that
the court failed to determine whether the nature of Silva's conduct, and the
context in which the alleged offenses took place, constituted harassment
"sufficiently severe or pervasive"42 to create a hostile academic environ-
ment for his students. Part I submits that Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972 contains an implied "hostile environment" cause of
action analogous to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and argues
that Silva created a hostile environment through his sexual illustrations.
Part II analyzes the notion of academic freedom in the classroom and
explores Silva's contention that his sexually-charged classroom speech was
protected under the First Amendment. Finally, Part III uses Silva as a
benchmark from which to differentiate constitutionally protected faculty
speech that is the product of an audacious pedagogical approach from
unprotected speech that truly harasses and injures students.
I. TITLE IX HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 contains an implied
hostile environment cause of action,43 it has twice addressed the issue in
4" The court concluded that Silva's First Amendment interest in his classroom speech was
"overwhelmingly superior" to UNH's interest in prohibiting it. Id. Placing a high value on
academic freedom, the court liberally quoted from the discussion of this principle in Ke.ishian:
[O]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom
is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. . . . The classroom is peculiarly the
"marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through a
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multi-
tude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."
Id. at 314 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 603 (1967)) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
42 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (noting that to establish
violation of Title VII based upon hostile work environment, harassment "must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions'" of workplace) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
41 In two decisions, the Supreme Court discussed the remedies available to students under
Title IX. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Court held that an
implied private right of action under Title IX exists, even though the statute does not specifically
provide for one. Id. at 708. Additionally, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
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the employment context under Title VII. In Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,' a former bank employee claimed that she had been subjected to
continuous sexual harassment by her supervisor during her four years at the
bank.45 The Supreme Court agreed that a hostile work environment claim
was actionable as a violation of Title VII46 if the basis for the claim was
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."' 47 This
determination is made by examining the nature of the sexual advances and
the particular context in which the alleged events took place. 48
In Harris v. Forklift Systems,4 9 the Supreme Court expanded the
"abusive work environment" standard articulated in Meritor. Harris
involved a company president's alleged sexual harassment of a female
manager of the company.5" The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
finding that the president's conduct did not create a hostile work environ-
60 (1992), the Court provided that monetary damages are an available remedy for students
victimized by individuals and schools that intentionally violate Title IX. Franklin, 503 U.S. at
75 n.8.
Although the Supreme Court had limited courts' jurisdiction over Title IX cases, see, e.g.,
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (holding that receipt of federal money by one
school program does not create jurisdiction under Title IX), the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987 expanded this jurisdiction. 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A) (1988); see also Carrie Baker,
Comment, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based Harassment of Students. 43 EMORY L. J.
271 (1994) (noting that Supreme Court has narrowed jurisdiction over Title IX cases).
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
45 Id. at 60. The supervisor's alleged harassment included repeated demands for sexual
favors, resulting in actual intercourse between the victim and her supervisor. Id. Ultimately. the
behavior allegedly led to forcible rape. Id.
4 Id. at 73.
41 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)). The Court held that because the victim's allegations in Meritor included not only extreme
harassment, but criminal conduct, she sufficiently stated a claim for "hostile environment" sexual
harassment. Id.
I Id. at 69 (quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
49 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
10 Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 369. A Magistrate found that during the complainant's tenure at
Forklift, her superior directed gender-based insults at her and subjected her to repeated, unwanted
sexual innuendos. Id. The president said to her several times, in front of other employees:
"You're a woman, what do you know?" Id. He also suggested that they both "go to the Holiday
Inn to negotiate [her] raise." Id. On various occasions, he threw objects on the ground in front
of the complainant and other women and asked them to pick up the objects. Id. at 369. He also
asked the plaintiff and several other female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket.
Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 369.
See also Supreme Court to Rule on Second Sexual Harassment Case (NPR radio broadcast.
Oct. 13, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. Theresa Harris. the plaintiff in
Harris v. Forklift Sys., detailed the effects of her superior's harassment: "I hated to go to work
I cried every day at work and I cried every day when I went home. There were a lot of days
[when] I would sit in my office and literally shake." Id.
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ment because it did not seriously affect the plaintiff's psychological well-
being." Adopting an objective standard,52 the Court emphasized that
Title VII provides protection long before an employee's psychological
health is seriously affected. 3 A violation of Title VII occurs when the
work environment can reasonably be perceived as being abusive or hostile,
and is in fact perceived as such.' In assessing whether an employer has
created a hostile environment, a jury must consider all relevant facts and
circumstances55 including: (1) whether the harassment was frequent and
severe; (2) whether the behavior was physically threatening or humiliating;
and (3) whether the conduct interfered with an employee's work perfor-
mance.
56
Courts 7 and commentators 8 have recognized an implied Title IX
• See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
.12 See id. at 370 ("This standard, which we reaffirm today, takes a middle path between
making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a
tangible psychological injury.").
11 Id. at 370-71. The majority stated:
Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect
employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from
advancing in their careers.
Id.
Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that the Court's
objective, reasonable person standard failed to clarify an already ambiguous standard forTitle VII
hostile environment cases. Id. at 372. "As a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually
unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is
egregious enough to warrant an award of damages.' Id.
5S Id. at 371.
5 Id.
-1 See, e.g., Parks v. Wilson, 872 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (D.S.C. 1995) (holding that standards
developed in Title VII litigation are appropriate guidelines for determining whether graduate
student suffered sexual harassment from professor); Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth.,
852 F. Supp. 1512 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (stating that jury could reasonably find student nurse
established hostile environment claim under Title VII and Title IX because she suffered from
unwelcome comments and sexual advances from employer on account of sex); Bustos v. Illinois
Inst. of Cosmetology, No. 93C5980, 1994 WL 710830, at *3 (N.D. III. Dec. 15, 1994)
(comparing effects of hostile work environment on employee's job performance to hostile
environment in educational setting); Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367, 375 (D.
Md. 1994) (determining that student's Title IX claims were appropriately evaluated under Title
VII standards); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, No. 93 Civ. 8771, 1994 WL
533411, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1994) (recognizing student's claim, but ultimately rejecting
it under both Title VII and Title IX), aff'd, 57 F.3d 243 (1995): Mann v. University of
Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44, 47 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (allowing student's hostile environment claim
under Title IX to proceed against school and individual officials in effort to fulfill "Supreme
Court's mandate to give Title IX 'a sweep as broad as its language'") (quoting North Haven Bd.
of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982)); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp.
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"hostile environment" claim by using Title VII as an analogous stan-
dard. 59 This interpretation of Title IX more effectively promotes the
1560. 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (recognizing Title IX hostile environment claim of junior high
student sexually harassed by other students); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist.. 830 F.
Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (recognizing student plaintiffs' right to state claim for hostile
environment sexual harassment under Title IX); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Medicine. 613
F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (allowing medical student's Title IX hostile environment claim
to be asserted against university but not against individual or medical clinic, neither of which
received federal funds), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
But see Seamons v. Snow. 864 F. Supp. 1111. 1118 (D. Utah 1994) ("Title IX does not
expressly create a cause of action based on negligence for hostile environment. It would be
inappropriate for this Court to import the doctrine of hostile environment sexual harassment from
Title VII into this Title IX action."); Bougher v. University of Pitt., 713 F. Supp. 139. 145
(W.D. Pa.) (declining to use Title VII as standard for Title IX action), aff'd, 882 F.2d 74 (3d
Cir. 1989).
11 See generally Baker, supra note 43, at 293-318 (proposing standards under federal law for
sex-based harassment of students based upon Title VII guidelines); Ingulli, supra note 1, at 285-
96 (outlining federal statutes and cases pertaining to sexual harassment in educational context and
analogizing Title VII's operation to that of Title IX); Schneider, supra note 5 (exploring scope
of Title IX and difficulties students face when bringing Title IX action); Kimberly A. Mango.
Comment. Students versus Professors: Combatting Sexual Harassment Under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 23 CONN. L. REV. 355, 360-90 (1991) (discussing legislative
history of Title IX, its interplay with Title VII, and arguing that statute includes remedy for
environmental sexual harassment of students).
" In the wake of the Meritor and Harris decisions, at least two circuits have accepted Title
IX hostile environment claims using Title VII as an analogous standard. See Lipsett v. University
of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988) (recognizing Title IX hostile environment claim
brought by female medical school student against University of Puerto Rico, several admin-
istrators, and director of residency program); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges &
Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311. 316 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that under doctrine of issue
preclusion, trial court's failure to find Title VII sex discrimination against fired instructor
collaterally estopped plaintiff's Title IX claim), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987). "Because Title
VII prohibits the identical conduct prohibited by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination, we regard it
as the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards . I.. d. at 316
n.6.
In Lipsett, the plaintiff alleged the existence of a particularly egregious hostile environment.
864 F.2d at 886. For example, she claimed that the chief resident, under whom she worked,
stated in the presence of the plaintiff and six male patients that he wanted to engage in sexual
intercourse with a nurse who walked by. Id. at 887. In another instance, as the plaintiff was
performing a rectal examination, the chief resident remarked to the patient that the plaintiff was
about to give the patient "pleasure." Id. Furthermore, the supervisor assigned the plaintiff trivial
tasks, commenting that women should not be surgeons because they were unreliable while
menstruating or while "in heat." Id.
The plaintiff also alleged sexual harassment by her male resident peers. Id. at 887-88. This
included hanging Playboy centerfolds upon the walls of the men's rest area, posting a list of
sexually offensive names for the female residents and posting a sexually explicit drawing of the
plaintiff's body on the bulletin board. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 888. The plaintiff and other female
residents could not avoid the offensive, sexually charged exhibits because all of the residents went
to the men's rest area during the day to receive and check for notices and to discuss administra-
tive matters. Id.
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statute's central purpose: the elimination of both sexual discrimination and
sexual harassment from public schools.' Such a reading is justified
because teachers have a unique influence on students' lives.6' This power,
when coupled with students' youth and inexperience, seems to make
students potentially more vulnerable than employees to the abuse of
authority that is the hallmark of sexual harassment. Therefore, it is
imperative that students receive the same hostile environment protections
under Title IX as employees are afforded under Title VII. 62
o See supra note 9.
62 See PALUDI & BARICKMAN. supra note 5, at 101-02 (describing nature of power possessed
by faculty members). "Professors give grades, write recommendations for graduate schools...
and can predispose colleagues' attitudes towards students." Id. at 102. A professor's greatest
power lies in his or her ability to affect a student's self esteem and to motivate or discourage a
pupil's learning through feedback and interaction with the student. Id.: see OFFICE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT'S NOT ACADEMIC (1991), reprinted
in EDUCATOR'S GUIDE To CONTROLLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT, Appendix 11 (1991). The OCR's
Guidelines state that sexual harassment may lead a student to receive undeserved grades in
important courses, force changes in courses of study, cause transfer to other colleges or
universities, impede the ability to secure importantjob referrals and contacts, and foster emotional
problems. Id.
A professor may manipulate this power to obtain sexual gratification in a number of ways.
See DZIECH & WEINER. supra note 3, at 122-24 (naming -counselor-helper." "confidante,"
"intellectual seducer," "opportunist," and "power broker" as roles played by harassing professors
seeking manipulative relationships with students). Rather than taking advantage of chance
opportunities or openly negotiating with his or her control over grades orjobs, a teacher/harasser
will often play one of these roles in an attempt to gain sexual favors from a student. Id.
6 Most colleges and universities have detailed complaint procedures designed to encourage
students to report cases of sexual harassment. See University Responses to Racial and Sexual
Harassment on Campuses, supra note 10, passim (addressing problems of racial and sexual
harassment on college campuses and discussing university responses to harassment in context of
proposed "Freedom of Speech on Campus Act"); see also EDUCATOR'S GUIDE TO CONTROLLING
SEXUAL HARASSMENT, Appendix V (1993) (reprinting selected sexual harassment policies and
procedures of Cornell University, Howard University, Middlebury College, Rice University,
University of Iowa, University of California, Santa Barbara, University of Minnesota, and
University of Wisconsin-Madison).
Some universities are considering proposals banning all student and faculty romantic
involvements. See Sonya Live: Student Affairs (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 7, 1993), avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Script File (discussing proposals and alternative plans to combat
sexual harassment on college campuses). One commentator has suggested a "Model Campus
Conduct Policy" that addresses potential First Amendment issues. See John T. Shapiro, Note, The
Call for Campus Conduct Policies: Censorship or Constitutionally Permissible Limitations on
Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 201, 229-37 (1990). The model policy incorporates a definition of
campus "hostile environment" that combines the Meritor standard adopted from Title VII with
time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. at 229-31. "A single harassing act may be so severe or
pervasive as to constitute a hostile environment in violation of this Policy." Id. at 231.
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B. Silva's Speech and Conduct Created a Hostile Environment
When the Meritor and Harris Title VII hostile environment standards
are applied to Silva's classroom examples, it is obvious that a hostile
environment was created. Clearly, Silva's students interpreted his words
as more than mere instructional tools.63 Furthermore, it is submitted that
the court ignored key facts which showed that Silva manifested a preoccu-
pation with sex both inside and outside the classroom.' In addition, these
facts support the conclusion that a reasonable female student would have
perceived Silva's speech and conduct as a severe, recurrent, and degrading
pattern of sexual harassment directed towards women.' Moreover, the
frequency and severity of Silva's sexual harassment would have led
reasonable jurors to conclude that such conduct would interfere with a
student's academic performance. 66
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
When professors are accused of hostile environment sexual harassment
they often justify their behavior by raising an academic freedom, First
Amendment defense.67 This concept of academic freedom68 is rooted in
I See Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 300-02 (detailing student perceptions of Professor Silva's
classroom speech). One student noted that her encounters with Silva involved "powerful, aggres-
sive, physical intimidation tactics" which made her very uncomfortable. Id. at 302. Most students
felt fear and did not wish to be alone with Silva. Id. at 300.
61 Id. at 301-02, 306-07. For example, Silva assigned a project requiring students to reveal
"what they did, with whom they did it, as well as what they thought and dreamed about." Id. at
307.
1 This was the precise determination made by the UNH hearing panel. See Silva. 888 F.
Supp. at 307. "[A] reasonable female student would find Professor Silva's comments and his
behavior to be offensive, intimidating and contributing to a hostile academic environment." Id.
66 Cf. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371 (noting factors which jury should consider in determining
whether environment is hostile). For examples of Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment, see Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990) (derogatory and sexual
remarks made to female police officer); Waltman v. International Paper Co.. 875 F.2d 468 (5th
Cir. 1989) (female employee repeatedly groped and propositioned); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,
833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987) (black female security guard subjected to racial and sexual
harassment); Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985) (female police
officer subjected to lewd sexual comments and innuendos and discriminatory employment action).
67 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text; see also Shapiro, supra note 62, at 209-19
(examining several Supreme Court cases occurring in academic context involving First Amend-
ment, with competing interests arising in each case); John M. Ryan, Comment, Teacher Free
Speech in the Public Schools: Just When You Thought It Was Safe to Talk. 67 NEB. L. REV. 695.
696 (1988) (stating that public school teachers have fewer constitutional rights than ordinary
citizens).
I In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). the
Supreme Court opined:
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the belief that the university is a "marketplace of ideas"69 committed to
the largely unfettered flow of opinion and information.7' Admittedly,
teachers and students must be free to reason, think, speak, and disagree in
a tolerant educational environment that inculcates the values of a modern
society without unduly restraining individual autonomy or freedom.7'
Thus, the freedom of expression sought in a "marketplace of ideas"
occasionally requires tolerance of provocative speech or conduct which may
offend many in the university community.'
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for
almost 50 years.
Id.; see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us ....
[It is] a special concern of the First Amendment.. . ."), see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than
in the community of American schools."); William A. Kohlburn. Note, The Double-Edged Svord
of Academic Freedom: Cutting the Scales of Justice in Title VII Litigation. 65 WASH. U. L.Q.
445, 446 (1987) (arguing that Supreme Court analyzes classroom First Amendment issues
separately from academic freedom, and that "academic context" merely "heighten[s] the Court's
concern" in such cases).
69 "The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out
of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."' Keyishian.
385 U.S. at 603 (citation omitted): see Terrence Leas & Charles J. Russo, Waters v. Churchill:
Autonomy for the Academy or Freedom for the Individual, Dec. 1994, available in WESTLAW,
JRL Database ("In fact, compared with their colleagues in public elementary and secondary
schools, faculty in higher education have significantly fewer limitations on their academic freedom
... [due to] their search for truth as researchers coupled with their work involving adult learners
o "[A college campus], at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a
[traditional] public forum. . . . The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly
the marketplace of ideas." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (citation omitted)
(quotations omitted); see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.
.. [W e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that
we loathe and believe to be fraught with death . . ").
11 "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom." Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487; Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
1 Colleges and universities have increasingly addressed the dilemma of maintaining a free
and tolerant academic environment when confronted with campus speech, expression, or conduct
that students, professors, or administrators find objectionable. See generally Craig B. Anderson,
Political Correctness on College Campuses: Freedom of Speech v. Doing the Politically Correct
Thing, 46 SMU L. REV. 171 (1992) (addressing conflict between "political correctness" and First
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This freedom, however, is not boundless. Courts must balance the
university's interest in regulating teachers' speech and conduct with
academic freedom and the professors' right to speak on matters of public
concern.73 A "matter of public concern" encompasses "any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community,"'  but does not
Amendment rights); James Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadnmap to the Regulation of Campus
Hate Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 163 (1991) (describing rights conflict between freedom of
speech and expression on college campuses and right of targeted groups to be free from
harassment); Steven R. Glaser, Comment, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But Words
Can Never Hurt Me: Regulating Speech on Universit. Campuses, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 265 (1992)
(discussing and analyzing problems created by hate speech codes); Thomas L. McAllister. Com-
ment, Rules and Rights Colliding: Speech Codes and the First Amendment on College Campuses.
59 TENN. L. REV. 409. 424 (1992) (arguing that "[clolleges and universities . . . should be
fortresses where restrictions on speech are not tolerated"). The concept of a hostile educational
environment as a limitation on free speech may be justified by reference to existing restrictions
on expression. See Weinstein, supra, at 172-90: University Responses to Racial and Sexual
Harassment on Campuses, supra note 10, at 14-27 (statements of William M. Schendel. Indiana
University; Kenya Welch, Clemson University; and Jonathan Karl, Vassar College) (presenting
personal accounts of harassment and discrimination on college campuses). But see id. at 5
(statement of Sen. Craig):
[Any thoughtful citizen understands the danger in the method of attacking the problem
[of sexual harassment]. Speech restrictions don't just blunt a weapon that could be
used to do harm-they also destroy. . . the best weapon any of us have to fight against
harassment itself.
There is another danger as well. The power of censoring certain ideas carries
with it the ability to shape and control human understanding. That is why in some
quarters, speech restrictions are not viewed as shields for protecting students, but as
tools for indoctrinating them.
Id.
7' See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563. 568 (1968) ("The problem in any case
is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State. as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.").
Several cases have addressed the constitutionality of university speech codes. most have
restricted their scope or entirely struck them down on vagueness or overbreadth grounds. See Iota
Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Va.
1991) (-The First Amendment does not recognize exceptions for bigotry, racism, and religious
intolerance or ideas on matters some may deem trivial, vulgar or profane."). aff'd. 993 F.2d 386
(1993); Wu v. University of Conn.. No. H-89-649 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 1990) (discontinuing
aspects of speech code that forbid offensive, indecent, or abusive language and replacing them
with rules addressed to "face to face use of 'fighting words'"); U.W.M. Post, Inc. v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down
University of Wisconsin speech code on overbreadth grounds); Doe v. University of Mich., 721
F. Supp. 852, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding university's policy on discrimination and harass-
ment of students unconstitutionally overbroad and vague); cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538 (1992) (holding city ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly conduct facially invalid
under First Amendment).
' Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). The Court held that if employee expression
does not relate to a matter of public concern, courts should defer to government officials in the
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involve personal issues.75 In addition, a professor's interest in expressing
herself on a matter 6 must be weighed against any injury that her speech
could cause to the public university's ability to promote the educational
services it provides through its faculty employees.77
management of their offices "without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment." Id.
11 See id. at 147:
MWihen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest . . . a federal court is
not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken
by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.
Id.
76 Recently in Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1882 (1994), the Supreme Court
addressed whether the Connick test should be applied to something the government-employer
thought the employee said, or to what the fact-finder ultimately determined had been said. The
Court emphasized the difference between the government's roles as sovereign and as employer,
as well as the resulting First Amendment implications of each, noting:
The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment decisions... [is that
the] government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as
possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to
a significant one when it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict the speech
of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the government is
employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals. such
restrictions may well be appropriate.
Id. at 1888. The Court held that where parties fundamentally disagree on the context of the
speech at issue, courts should base their decisions on the facts as the employer reasonably found
them to be. Id. at 1889. Employers, however, must reach their conclusions in good faith, using
"the care that a reasonable manager would use before making an employment decision . . . of
the sort involved in the particular case." Id. Finally, the Court held that once an employee is
discharged for disruptive speech, regardless of whether it involves a matter of public concern,
it becomes irrelevant whether the rest of the speech was related to a matter of public concern and
was nondisruptive. Id. at 1891. An employee, therefore, cannot escape discharge by surrounding
an unprotected statement with protected ones. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1891 (relying on Mount
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977)).
Waters' impact on faculty speech was recently demonstrated in a Second Circuit case.
Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir.), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994). In Jeffries,
Leonard Jeffries, a black studies professor at the City College of New York was removed from
his position as Department Chairman after giving a controversial speech on the bias he perceived
to exist in New York State's public school curriculum. Id. at 1241. During the off-campus speech
he made a number of statements disparaging members of several groups, particularly Jews. Id.
at 1242. The court held that by reducing Jeffries' term as chairman the defendants-the president,
chancellor, and trustees of the City College of New York-violated Jeffries' First Amendment
right to free speech. Id. at 1241. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reevaluation in light
of Waters. Harleston v. Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994).
" Connick, 461 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted). An inquiry into the "manner, time, and place"
of the conduct is also relevant. Id. at 152. The Connick Court noted that "[w]hether an
employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form.
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 147-48 (footnote
omitted). In Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the
Supreme Court added a causation requirement to the Connick-Pickering test, making it more
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It is suggested that the Silva court employed circular reasoning in
reaching its decision that Silva's "focus" metaphor and "vibrator" simile
related to matters of public concern. 8 Rather than ascertaining whether
the statements themselves implicated matters of public concern, the court
affirmatively categorized them as part of a larger, "academic freedom"
controversy.79 It then determined that the illustrations necessarily related to
matters of public concern.' Therefore, the district court erred by focusing
on the preexisting debate over academic freedom as a justification for its
conclusion concerning sexual harassment.8 It is submitted that this type
of circular analysis effectively converts any type of faculty speech, no
matter how outrageous or injurious, into a "matter of public concern" due
merely to its controversial nature.' Sexual harassment, however, like
difficult for teachers to assert their First Amendment rights. Id. at 287. The Court held that a
teacher carried a prima facie burden of demonstrating that his conduct was constitutionally
protected and was a "substantial factor" in the school board's decision not to rehire him: such
determination must be made whether absent the teacher's conduct, employer would have acted
similarly. Id.
For a case examining the limits of the public concern test, see Rankin v. McPherson. 483
U.S. 378 (1987). In Rankin, a data-entry employee in a county police office was fired for
remarking to a co-worker, after learning of an attempt to kill the President, "'[]f they go for him
again, I hope they get him.'" Id. at 381. The Court emphasized Connick's context factor and
noted that the conversation involved the policies of the President's administration which is a
matter of public concern. Id. at 386-87. After completing the Connick-Pickering analysis, the
Court held that the employee's discharge violated her First Amendment right to freedom of
expression. Id. at 392.
78 See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text (discussing rationale of Silva court).
" Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 314. "[T]he preservation of academic freedom is a matter of public
concern." Id. at 315.
o Id. at 316. The court determined that Silva's statements were related to matters of public
concern because in "content, form, and context [they] directly related to (1) the preservation of
academic freedom and (2) the issue of whether speech which is offensive to a particular class of
individuals should be tolerated in American schools." Id.
sI See id. at 314.
See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387 ("The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement
is irrelevant to the question [of] whether it deals with a matter of public concern."). Courts have
varied in their determinations of what constitutes matters of public or private concern in the
public school context. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (finding that
college teacher's legislative testimony in favor of granting four-year status for college was matter
of public concern): Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist.. 890 F.2d 794. 802 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that teacher's failure to use appropriate administrative channels to approve reading list
raised matter of private concern), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990); Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d
728, 732 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that allegations on preferential grading of athletes and grades
given in exchange for sexual favors are matters of public concern). cert. denied. 498 U.S. 821
(1990); Saye v. Saint Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 785 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that
teacher's complaints about allocation of aide time among teachers did not involve matter of public
concern); Day v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 768 F.2d 696, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating
that teacher's protest of unfavorable job evaluation raised matter of private concern), cert. denied,
STUDENT HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
other forms of unprotected speech, does not become a matter of public
concern, and shall not acquire First Amendment protection, solely because
it is controversial and has been well-documented. 3
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT VS. OFFENSIVE SPEECH
Although in many cases teachers' sexual harassment of students is
unequivocal and easily recognizable,' there is often disagreement over
what constitutes "inappropriate" behavior.' This ambiguity endangers
474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
8 "[lit is not always enough that the subject matter of a communication be one in which there
might be general interest, . . . but that what is actually said on the topic is the crux of the public
concern content inquiry." Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317 n.1 (10th Cir. 1986)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987); see Egger v.
Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 316-17 (7th Cir.) ("In assessing whether the speech touches upon a matter
of public concern, it is important not to equate the public's curiosity about a matter with a matter
having societal ramifications."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983); Hullman v. Board of Trustees
of Pratt Community College, 725 F. Supp. 1536, 1545 (D. Kan. 1989) ("Plaintiffs cannot bring
constitutional light to their personal grievances by bootstrapping them onto issues of public
concern by general references to the manner in which public institutions are conducted.") (citation
omitted), afo"d, 950 F.2d 665 (1991).
Even assuming that Silva's speech implicated matters of public concern, it is submitted that
his First Amendment interest did not outweigh UNH's interest in promoting a harmonious
academic environment. See Hanton v. Gilbert, 842 F. Supp. 845, 851 (D.N.C.) (holding that
university employee's interest in First Amendment rights were outweighed by damage to morale
and efficiency in biology department), aff'd, 36 F.3d 4 (4th Cir. 1994). Indeed, Silva used two
sexually explicit examples when there were numerous other ways to teach the same concepts.
I See Shub v. Hankin, 869 F. Supp. 213, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 66 F.3d 308 (2d Cir.
1995). The district court dismissed the procedural due process complaint of a professor who was
suspended from teaching after allegedly engaging in several inappropriate behaviors towards
female students, including: inviting several female students for drinks, commenting on a student's
perfume, requesting home telephone numbers from students, and touching a female student while
asking her questions about her personal life. Id.; see In re Kozy, 371 S.E.2d 778, 782 (N.C.
1988) (affirming lower court judgment against professor who sexually harassed several female
students). In Kozy:
Claudia Williams observed [the professor] fondling a necklace Daisy Morales was
wearing around her neck which was hanging between her breasts.. . . [Morales] also
complained ... about [the professor] repeatedly putting his arms around her and
leaning against her while examining her classwork. [The professor] testified that he had
a habit of frequently placing his arms around students but did not feel that his behavior
was offensive or intimidating.
Id. at 781.
1 See Mann v. University of Cin., 864 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (denying partial
summary judgment to student who claimed that professor created hostile environment by asking
her to sleep with him); ROIPHE, supra note 1, at 90-91 ("The clarity of the definition of sexual
harassment as a 'hostile work environment' depends on a universal code of conduct. a shared idea
of acceptable behavior that we just don't have. Something that makes one person feel
uncomfortable may make another person feel great.").
Under Catharine A. MacKinnon's broad definition of sexual harassment, it is possible to
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the free exchange of views and pedagogical experimentation in the
"marketplace of ideas," which ultimately hinders the educational process
itself.86 The facts and circumstances in Silva highlight this ambiguity.
Students have the right to be free from an abusive educational
environment; there is, however, no similar constitutional right to be free
from offensive language.' Too often, affronted students confuse "hostile
argue that Silva imposed an unwanted element of sexuality into his classroom, a place where he
enjoyed power and influence over his students. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (stating
MacKinnon's definition of sexual harassment); see also Schneider, supra note 5. at 534-35
("[Tihe question of legally cognizable sexual harassment in any setting turns on abuse of power
in relationships . . . . Sexual harassment of a student by a faculty member, like that of an
employee by an employer or supervisor involves the exploitation of a power relationship.-)
(footnotes omitted). According to these definitions of sexual harassment, each of Silva's students
would have a claim of sexual harassment against the Professor. Yet, if one employs the Meritor
and Harris definitions of hostile environment sexual harassment. Silva's speech would have
constituted sexual harassment only if it had been "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to transform
the students' educational environment into one reasonably perceived as being abusive or hostile.
See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Meritor and Harris decisions).
Although the students in Silva who suffered harassment outside of class could satisfy this
requirement, it is doubtful that any of the students who merely heard the illustrations in class
could meet this test.
8 See The Speech Police, supra note 12 and accompanying text. "Some teachers now even
tape-record their lectures, in case of a lawsuit. Better just not talk about race or sex or anything
that might 'hurt.' Yet. . .many [students] said these things ought to be talked about." Id. When
asked in a CNN interview if after his experience there were things he would not discuss in class.
Professor Graydon Snyder responded: "I'm a bit careful, and I think I should not be careful.
When I hit a story which has deep sexual implications, I probably skip it. or I allow the students
to bring it up." CNN News: Teacher Says Gender Correctness Won Over Free Speech (CNN
television broadcast, May 12, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library. Script File: see
Johnson, supra note 12 (describing chilling effect that possibility of sexual harassment charges
has on intellectual dialogue in colleges and universities); see also ROIPHE, supra note 1. at 92-93:
Many professors follow an unwritten rule: never close the door to your office when
you and a female student are inside . . . .The irony is that these open doors, and all
that they symbolize, threaten to create barriers between faculty and students. In the
present hypersensitive environment . . . . [it may be easier not to pursue friendships
with female students than to risk charges of sexual harassment and misunderstood
intentions. The rhetoric surrounding sexual harassment encourages a return to formal
relations between faculty and students.
Id.
7 "[TIhe fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing
it." ROIPHE, supra note 1, at 92-93 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726. 745 (1978)):
see Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (-[Tihe mere dissemination of ideas
• .* no matter how offensive to good taste. . . on a state university campus may not be shut off
in the name alone of 'conventions of decency.'"); see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
592 (1969) (-It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.")
(citations omitted).
In an interview with Playboy Magazine, Nadine Strossen, the President of the ACLU
discussed the implications of offensive speech:
STUDENT HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
environment" with "offensive speech" and sue on the basis of the latter.8"
As the Silva court noted, such claims should not be rewarded with a
remedy since it is presumed that college students possess a certain level of
sophistication and maturity.8 9 When professors like Silva, however, create
an abusive academic environment by implementing an unnecessary and
unwanted element of sexuality into the classroom, faculty speech evolves
from constitutionally protected, offensive speech into unprotected sexual
harassment. 9°
CONCLUSION
Uncertainty over where the line should be drawn between an
experimental or audacious pedagogical approach and sexually abusive
speech continues to plague the courts. Silva may have intended his sexual
illustrations to be a legitimate, instructive tool for his technical writing
class. For many of his female students, however, Silva's behavior was
simply an attempt to obtain personal sexual gratification at the cost of
creating a hostile educational environment. The Silva Court incorrectly
ratified Silva's effort to disguise his purpose by wrapping himself in the
blanket of academic freedom. Professors who truly deserve the vital
safeguards of academic freedom do not require the protection of a selective
Controversial subjects are subjects on which people have deep feelings and therefore
are likely to be offended. Constitutional law is filled with controversy. If I am to fulfill
my responsibility to expose my students to all points of view, everybody should be
offended by something that's being said .. . .The notion that an idea or work of art
should not offend anybody who happens to hear or look at it is absolutely appalling.
Dorothy Atcheson, The PlayboyForum: Defending Pornography Face-to-Face with the President
of the ACLU, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1995, at 108.
1 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (defining "hostile environment" and
discussing the Snyder and Rogers cases).
" See Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 313 (quoting Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir.
1971) (per curiam)).
[F]ree speech does not grant teachers a license to say or write in class whatever they
may feel like ... and ... the propriety of regulations or sanctions must depend on
such circumstances as the age and sophistication of the students, the closeness of the
relation between the specific technique used and some concededly valid educational
objective, and the context and manner of presentation.
Id.
I See Donna Prokop, Note, Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking a Balance Between First
Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2533, 2540 (1993) (-[C]ourts
generally uphold disciplinary action against a teacher for in-class speech if there is a rational
relationship between the speech and a legitimate pedagogical goal. Avoiding disruption of the
classroom almost always suffices to provide the court with such a goal.") (footnotes omitted); see
also Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[A]cademic freedom [is not] a license
for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular contents and internally
destructive of the proper functioning of the institution."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973).
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interpretation of facts. Such interpretation ignores faculty conduct which
substantially contributes to a hostile classroom environment. Although the
notion of academic freedom should protect faculty members who sincerely
push the boundaries of pedagogical convention, it should not serve to shield
those who use their position to harass and degrade their students.
Timothy E. Di Domenico
